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I. INTRODUCTION
In a world where a best-selling novel becomes a movie and a blockbuster film
becomes a book and where both spawn sequels, television series, video games,
and other merchandise, the transfer and licensing of copyrights for publishing and
for production of derivative works provide the intangible foundation for multimillion-dollar entertainment and retail industries. But what about the unknown
author who penned that manuscript and desperately sold the publishing rights on
the cheap, the musician suckered out of his song rights for much-needed pennies,
the starving screenwriter who got the raw end of the deal, and all of their
respective families? For those authors who could not have known when they
signed on the dotted line how successful their copyrighted work would be or that
legislation would later extend the duration of the copyrights they were
transferring,' Congress created a safeguard: termination rights. Termination
rights, or termination of transfer rights, provide statutory procedures through
which an author of a copyrighted work (or upon the author's death, his statutory
heirs) may, in certain circumstances, nullify previous transfers of copyrights and
2
renegotiate bargains that more accurately reflect the true value of the work.
While termination rights serve as an escape route for an author, or his heirs,
bound by the terms of a bargain that was entered before the market value of the
copyright to the author's work could be determined, termination rights are a
constant threat to the publishing house, the record company, and the film
producer whose rights to future profit from the author's work could be erased by
a valid notice of termination.
Termination rights, though first inscribed in U.S. copyright law in the
Copyright Act of 1976, 3 are a topic of increasing importance in the twenty-first
century. Of the three termination provisions of the 1976 Act, 5 304(c) and §
304(d) will continue to be employed for the next few decades to terminate
transfers made before 1978. 4 Copyright transfers made in, or after, 1978 will
begin to enter the window for exercise of termination rights under 5 203(a)
beginning January 1, 2013, with notices of termination perhaps already issued.'

I Since the fifty-six-year total copyright term was enacted in the Copyright Act of 1909,
Congress has extended that term several times, including most recently with the enactment of the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA). See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
2 Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1985).
3 17 U.S.C. § 203, 304 (2000).
4 See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c), (d).
' See Michael I. Rudell & Neil J. Rosini, 'Grapes of Wrath' Case Shows Difficulies of Copyright
Termination, N.Y. L.J. Aug. 25, 2006, at 3 (noting that notices of termination can be issued up to ten
years before the effective date of the termination).
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TERMINATION RIGHTS

Termination rights are generally accepted to be inalienable,6 such that they
cannot be transferred or surrendered. Thus, it seems clear that one could not
expressly transfer or surrender termination rights as part of the consideration of
a contract.8 However, a less clear case exists where copyright transferees argue
that certain post-transfer agreements entered into with an heir of the author
preclude the exercise of termination rights.' Capitalizing on the differences
between the requirements for termination of pre-1978 transfers and termination
of transfers made during or after 1978,1" these transferees argue that the author's
heir has effectively surrendered the author's family's termination rights by
executing a non-terminable post-1978 agreement that replaced a previously
terminable pre-1978 agreement executed by the author." While at least one trial
court in the Second Circuit has rejected such an argument based on the Second
Circuit's interpretation of the termination provisions and the legislative policy
behind them, 2 the Ninth Circuit has allowed such an argument to prevail, finding
it appropriate under contract law and consistent with the purposes of the 1976
Act's termination provisions.' 3 This emerging split between the Second and

6 SeeJULIEE. COHEN ETAL., COPYRIGHTINA GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 180

(2d ed.

2006) ("The termination of transfer provisions, on the other hand, make the right to terminate a
transfer inalienable."); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMERON COPYRIGHT § 11.07
(2006) ("Given that Widow, Children, and Grandchildren are the precise parties that Congress
intended to favor by enactment of the termination framework, and given that Congress legislated
their entitlement to be inalienable... .'); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) ("The 1976
Copyright Act provides a single, fixed term, but provides an inalienable termination right.").
7 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1348 (8th ed. 2004).
8 See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supranote 6, § 11.07 ("Thus, one who proposes to purchase rights
in a newly created work may not exert greater bargaining power so as to require the author to agree
to surrender his or her future right of termination as a condition of sale.').
9 See id. (listing examples of arguments that post-transfer agreements between the transferee and
the author or the author's heirs have precluded the author or the author's heirs from exercising
termination rights).
" Namely, that transfers made before 1978 are terminable even if not made by the author, while
transfers made on or after January 1, 1978 are only terminable if executed by the author. See infra
notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 109, 147 and accompanying text; 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 11.07
(describing a hypothetical situation that is strikingly similar to the facts in Steinbeck v. Mcintosh & Otis,
Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y.2006), and in which an author's widow, by agreeing in 2001 to
rescind a 1970 publication contract and substitute it with a new one, may attempt to preclude the
author's children from terminating the original grant).
12 See Steinbeck v. McIntosh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 395, 397-99, 401-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
13 See Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036, 1045-47 (9th Cir. 2005); see
also
Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewbom, No. CV05-452RGKSGLX, 2006 WL 3333715, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 9, 2006) (adopting the Ninth Circuit's stance on alienability even further by construing the
author's heir's post-transfer agreement not as effectively surrendering the heir's termination rights
by superseding the prior transfer, but rather as kteral surrendering that heir's termination rights:
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Ninth Circuits concerning the application of copyright termination law is
particularly significant given the importance of those two circuits in interpreting
copyright law generally. 4
The Supreme Court recently declined an opportunity to address the alienability
of copyright termination rights," which perhaps suggests that a circuit split does
not exist or will not likely be problematic in the future. However, the purpose of
this Note is to show the true tension between decisions within the Second and
Ninth Circuits and to address those circuits' divergent approaches towards the
interpretation of termination rights. The Second Circuit has favored a more literal
interpretation of the language of the copyright termination provisions, in light of
the purpose and legislative intent behind the enactment of those provisions. 6 By
contrast, the Ninth Circuit has read the same statutory language very narrowly,
limiting its effect on state contract law."7 Second Circuit courts have maintained
that termination rights cannot be alienated or relinquished either expressly or
through the effect of contracts, even if the surrender is voluntary.' 8 The Ninth
Circuit, however, has determined that the voluntary execution of a new agreement

"the Court finds that [the] 1978 Assignment did not substitute the 1976 Assignment, but rather gave
up the Additional Rights to LTI including relinquishing Mewborn's right of termination under the
1976 Act. As a result of this relinquishment, her 1996 Notice of Termination was ineffective....').
14 See COHEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 336 ("[The Second and Ninth Circuits] and their lower
courts tend to be leaders in the copyright field given the presence of substantial publishing,
entertainment, and software companies in their jurisdictions.").
15 See Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Slesinger, 126 S. Ct. 2969 (2006) (mem.) (denial of petition for writ
of certiorari to the Ninth Circuit).
16 SeeLarry Spier, Inc. v. Bourne Co., 953 F.2d 774,779-80 (2d Ci. 1992) ("[Section 304(c)] was
drafted so as to leave no doubt about the family's power to recapture the copyright. Indeed, Section
304(c) (5) expressly provides that termination 'may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the
contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant.' "); Marvel Characters
v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280,290-91 (2d Cir. 2002) ("When examining the legislative intent and purpose
of § 304(c), it becomes clear that an agreement made after a work's creation stipulating that the work
was created as a work for hire constitutes an 'agreement to the contrary' which can be disavowed
pursuant to the statute. Any other construction of § 304(c) would thwart the clear legislative
purpose and intent of the statute.").
" See Milne, 430 F.3d at 1043 ("Section 304(c)(5) states that a'[tierminaton... may be effected
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including any agreement to make a will or to make
any future grant.' The statute does not define the phrase 'agreement to the contrary,' although it
does provide two examples ....The undisputed fact that the 1983 agreement does not fall into
either category supports the district court's finding that the 1983 agreement is not 'an agreement to
the contrary.' ').
18 Steinbeck v. McIntosh & Otis, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 395, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("To protect
this [termination] right and prevent creators or statutory heirs from contracting away, for whatever
reason, this absolute right to 'recapture' for the years of extended protection any pre-1978 copyright
grant, the statute declares void any contract the effect of which is in contravention of or which
negates either of these termination rights.").
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that benefits the author's family is an acceptable alternative means of achieving
the underlying goals of the 1976 Act without formal exercise of termination
rights, even though the execution of such an agreement by one heir deprives all
other heirs of the opportunity to exercise their termination rights. 9
To address the divergent approaches taken by the courts of the Second and
Ninth Circuits in interpreting the copyright termination provisions, this Note will
begin with the legal history and policy background of termination rights, their
legislative purpose, and a basic explanation of the statutory provisions governing
them. Next, this Note will highlight district and appellate judicial decisions from
within the Second and Ninth Circuits that define both sides of the emerging
circuit split concerning the alienability of termination of transfer rights.
This Note will then analyze the reasoning of decisions from both circuits,
noting the weaknesses in the Ninth Circuit's approach. Furthermore, this Note
will argue that the Second Circuit's interpretation and application of the
termination provisions is more faithful to the statutory language and the legislative
history of the Copyright Act, leads to more fair and consistent results, and
establishes a more administrable legal standard. Finally, this Note will conclude
that, in light of both the importance of the Second and Ninth Circuits in
interpreting copyright law and the likelihood of future litigation on the alienability
of termination rights, the Supreme Court should step in and settle the circuit split.
In resolving that conflict, the Court should overrule the Ninth Circuit's narrow
interpretation and conservative application of § 304(c)(5) in favor of the Second
Circuit's broad interpretation and liberal application of § 304(c)(5) to invalidate
agreements that prohibit the exercise of copyright termination rights.
II. BACKGROUND
To address the growing difference between the Second and Ninth Circuits'
interpretations of whether statutory termination rights may be surrendered,
waived, or otherwise alienated by contractual arrangement before their formal
exercise, this Part will first provide some background into the law concerning
termination rights. First, this Part will set forth the legal history, policy
background, and legislative purpose of termination rights. Then, this Part will
explicate the statutory provisions governing termination rights. These provisions

19 See Milne, 430 F.3d at 1045-46 ("Congress specifically stated that it did not intend for the
statute to 'prevent the parties to a transfer or license from voluntarily agreeing at any time to
terminate an existing grant and negotiating a new one[.]' Congress therefore anticipated that parties
may contract, as an alternative to statutory termination, to revoke a prior grant by replacing it with
a new one." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 127 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5743).
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determine which transfers may be terminated, when termination rights may be
exercised, and who may exercise them. Finally, this Part will describe district and
appellate decisions from the Second and Ninth Circuits that have interpreted the
termination provisions and their legislative history.
A. STATUTORY AND POLICY BACKGROUND FOR THE RECAPTURE OF PREVIOUSLY
TRANSFERRED COPYRIGHTS

Congress created termination rights in the Copyright Act of 1976.20 Congress
"expressly intended [termination rights] to relieve authors of the consequences of
ill-advised and unremunerative grants that had been made before the author had
a fair opportunity to appreciate the true value of his work product."2 1 According
to Congress, the termination provisions were necessary "because of the unequal
bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of
determining a work's value until it has been exploited. 22 Further, with respect
to the termination provisions governing transfers of copyrights that were
registered under the 1909 Act and that had their terms later extended by the 1976
Act,' Congress saw an additional reason for the enactment of termination rights:
to allow the author and his heirs to benefit from the new property right created
by the after-the-fact term extension.24
A similar legislative purpose had been previously expressed by Congress in
enacting the Copyright Act of 1909. Under the 1909 Act, a registered copyright
lasted fifty-six years. 25 The Act's scheme divided the copyright's life into an initial
term of twenty-eight years and a renewal term of twenty-eight years. 26 Because
of the bifurcated term, rights assigned in the copyright during the copyright's
initial term automatically reverted to the renewal claimant upon renewal,2" thereby
giving the renewal claimant leverage to renegotiate a new, fairer bargain after the
work proved to be valuable. In the House Report for the 1909 Act, Congress
reasoned that

20 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C.
(2000)).
21 Mills Music v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1985).
22 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reointedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740.
3 Copyright Act of 1976 § 304.
24 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 140 ("The arguments for granting rights of termination are even
more persuasive under section 304 than they are under section 203; the extended term represents
a completely new property right, and there are strong reasons for giving the author, who is the
fundamental beneficiary of copyright under the Constitution, an opportunity to share in it.").
2 Copyright Act of 1908, ch. 320, sec. 23,35 Star. 1075, 1080-81; see also 3 NIMMER& NIMMER,
supra note 6, § 9.08 (discussing the duration of copyrights).
' Copyright Act of 1909, sec. 23.
2' 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supranote 6, § 9.05[A] [1].
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[1Mt not infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright
outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum. If the work
proves to be a great success and lives beyond the term of twentyeight years, [the] committee felt that it should be the exclusive right
of the author to take the renewal term, and the law should be
framed as28is the existing law, so that he could not be deprived of
that right.
The Supreme Court in Stewart v. Abend, further affirmed that the renewal
provisions "were intended both to give the author a second chance to obtain fair
remuneration for his creative efforts and to provide the author's family a 'new
estate' if the author died before the renewal period arrived."29
The renewal rights under the 1909 Act were plagued with problems, however,
and were eventually ineffective in achieving Congress's intended purpose. First,
the renewal structure was procedurally difficult.3"
Second, because the
continuation of the copyright after the first twenty-eight years required the
affirmative act of renewal, an accidental failure to renew would cause the author
to lose half of the copyright term and the work to fall into the public domain.
,Thus, in addition to losing the second chance to obtain a fairer bargain that
Congress had intended, authors could also lose their ability to profit at all from
their creative works. Third, the Supreme Court's decision in FredFisherMusic Co.
v. M. Witmark & Sons, which upheld an author's assignment of renewal rights
before the vesting of those rights,3" eroded the effectiveness of the renewal rights
provisions in providing authors a second chance to obtain fair remuneration for
their creative efforts.33 Under the rule in Fisher, an author could easily be
pressured into assigning his renewal rights along with his copyrights, and thus be
deprived of the protection that the renewal rights were intended to provide him.3"

28 H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 14 (1909).
29 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990).
30

3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 9.03, 11.01 [A].

32

Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 656 (1943).

31Id. 5 11.01 [Al.

3 See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 11.07 ("Sadly, the Supreme Court largely

undermined effectiveness of the renewal structure ....The culprit was FredFisherMusic Co. v. M.
Witmark &Sons, which held that renewal rights may be assigned prior to their vesting. To avoid a
similar emasculation of the termination provisions, the current Act provides that '[t]ermination of
the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement
to make a will or to make any future grant.'" (quoting 17 U.S.C. 5 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5) (2000))).
34 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 9.06[B][1].
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B. THE COPYRIGHT ACT TERMINATION PROVISIONS

To solve the problems that prevented renewal rights from achieving
Congress's goals, in the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress changed the copyright
term structure and replaced renewal rights with termination rights.35 The 1976
Act did away with the bifurcated copyright term and, for works created on or
afterJanuary 1, 1978, provided for a copyright term equal to the life of the author
plus fifty years. 3 6 The institution of a single copyright term prevented authors
from losing half of their copyright term because of their inadvertent failure to
renew.3 7 However, while no action is required for a copyright to endure for its
entire term, under the 1976 Act previously transferred copyrights revert to the
author only upon affirmative exercise of termination rights.38 Additionally, to
ensure that termination rights would succeed where Fisher had caused the
copyright renewal scheme to fail,39 Congress made termination rights inalienable

31 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740 ("The
provisions of section 203 are based on the premise that the reversionary provisions of the present
section on copyright renewal (17 U.S.C. sec. 24) should be eliminated, and that the proposed law
should substitute for them a provision safeguarding authors against unremunerative transfers ....
Section 203 reflects a practical compromise that will further the objectives of the copyright law while
recognizing the problems and legitimate needs of all interests involved."); seealsoid at 127
("However, the [1976 Act] seeks to avoid the situation that has arisen under the present renewal
provision, in which third parties have brought up contingent future interests as a form of
speculation. Section 203(b)(4) would make a further grant of rights that revert under a terminated
grant valid 'only if it is made after the effective date of the termination.' ").
36 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572-73 (codified as
amended in 17 U.S.C.). In 1998, the CTEA added twenty years to the term lengths set by the 1976
Act, establishing a copyright term equal to the life of the author plus seventy years. Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b), 112 Stat. 2827,2827 (1998) (codified
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). This copyright term also applies to works created before January
1,1978, but which were neither copyrighted nor apart of the public domain. Id § 102(c). For works
registered under the 1909 Copyright Act and in their initial term on January 1, 1978, the 1976 Act
retained the original, initial-term length of twenty-eight years, but extended the renewal term to
forty-seven years, Copyright Act of 1976 § 304, which was extended to sixty-seven years by the
CTEA, Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, § 102(d)(1)(A). Copyrights registered before
1978 still in their renewal term when the CTEA took effect in 1998 "have a copyright term of 95
years from the date copyright was originally secured." Id § 102(d)(1)(B).
17 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
3 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 ("Instead of being automatic, as is theoretically the case
under [the 1909 Copyright Act], the termination of a transfer or license under section 203 [or section
304 of the 1976 Copyright Act] would require the serving of an advance notice within specified time
limits and under specified conditions.").
'9See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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by inserting language into the statute explicitly stating that termination "may be
effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. ,40
There are three provisions of the 1976 Act that concern termination rights:
§ 203(a), § 304(c), and § 304(d). Section 203(a) addresses the termination of
transfers executed on or after January 1, 1978,"' while § 304(c) and § 304(d)
address the termination of transfers executed before 1978 of works still under
copyright onJanuary 1, 1978.42 The termination provision in § 304(c) was created
in conjunction with the 1976 Act's nineteen-year term extension to allow an
author to recapture his rights for the extended term at the point where the old
fifty-six-year term would have otherwise ended. 43 The termination provision in
§ 304(d) was created in conjunction with the twenty-year extension created by the
CTEA,4 and applies only to copyrighted works in their renewal term on October
27, 1998"s and to transfers for which the unexercised termination right under §
304(c) expired prior to October 27, 1998.'
These three termination
provisions-§ 203(a), § 304(c), and § 304(d)-outline the transfers that are subject
to termination, when termination rights may be exercised, and who may exercise
them.
1. Which TranfersMay be Terminated. Generally speaking, the 1976 Act's three
Nermination provisions allow termination of exclusive or nonexclusive transfers
of copyrights, or of any right under a copyright, as long as the transfer meets all
the requirements of one of the three provisions.47 The two major categories of

40 17 U.S.C. %203(a)(5), 304(c)(5) (2000); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 127 ("However, the
[1976 Act] seeks to avoid the situation that has arisen under the present renewal provision, in which
third parties have bought up contingent future interests as a form of speculation.").
4117 U.S.C. 203.
42 17 U.S.C. § 304(c), (d).
4'Rudell & Rosini, supra note 5, para. 7 ("The first opportunity, under § 304(c), was created in
1978 when the term of copyright was extended by 19 years and the author or his or her successors
were given a chance to recapture rights in the extended term.").
Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b)-(d), 112 Stat. 2827,
2827-28 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
4517 U.S.C. 304(b).
- 17 U.S.C. § 304(d).
47See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) ("[O]ther than a work made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant
of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a copyright, executed by the author on or
afterJanuary 1, 1978, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination.'); 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) ("In the
case of any copyright subsisting in either its first or renewal term on January 1, 1978, other than a
copyright in a work made for hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of the
renewal copyright or any right under it, executed before January 1, 1978, by any of the persons
designated by subsection (a) (1)(C) of this section, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination.");
17 U.S.C. § 304(d) ("In the case of any copyright other than a work made for hire, subsisting in its
renewal term on the effective date of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act [effective
October 27, 1998] for which the termination right provided in subsection (c) has expired by such
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transfers that are always excluded from statutory termination under both § 203
and § 304 are transfers made by will and transfers of copyrights of works for
hire. 48 However, there is also an important difference in the kinds of transfers
that may be terminated under the two sections. Under § 304, termination rights
49
can be applied to transfers made by any of the statutorily designated persons,
while § 203 requires that the author have executed the transfer to be terminated. 0
This difference in the statutory requirements for termination between transfers
made before 1978 and transfers made in or after 1978 is the basis for the issue
that is central to both the Ninth Circuit's decision in Milne51 and the Southern
District of New York's decision in Steinbeck. 2 By entering into a post-1978
agreement with an heir of the deceased author, transferees have sought to trap the
author's heirs in a situation where no transfer remains that can be terminated
under either § 203 or § 304."3
2. When TransfersMay be Terminated. There is a five-year window during which
an eligible transfer may be terminated.54 Section 203 ties the window during
which termination rights may be exercised for a particular transfer to the date of
the transfer sought to be terminated."5 Section 304, however, determines the
period during which termination rights may be exercised from the date of the
issuance of the copyright.s6 For transfers executed on or after January 1, 1978,

date, where the author or owner of the termination right, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a
transfer or license of the renewal copyright or any right under it, executed before January 1, 1978,
by any persons designated in subsection (a)(1)(c) of this section, other than by will, is subject to
termination under the following conditions.").
8 See supra note 47.

9 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)-(d); supra note 47.
17 U.S.C. § 203(a); supra note 47. Congress allowed transfers executed by someone other than
the author to be terminable under § 304, but not under § 203, because § 304 applies to copyrights
registered under the renewal structure, which allowed an author's surviving spouse and issue to
transfer their contingent renewal rights prior to their vesting. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 140 (1976),
reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5756-57. However, because the 1976 Act's termination scheme
does not allow transfers of contingent future interests under a termination rights, Congress did not
find it necessary to provide in § 203 for the termination of transfers executed by someone other than

the author on or afterJanuary 1, 1978. Id. However, Nimmer points to an error in this reasoning,
stating that "this distinction appears to be based upon the erroneous assumption that any grant
executed on or after January 1, 1978, necessarily relates to a work having first been accorded
statutory copyright on or after such date." 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 11.02[A] [4] [a].
s Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005).
52 Steinbeck v. McIntosh & Otis, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
5' E.g., Defendant-Appellee's Answering Brief at 21-23, Milner ex reL Coyne v. Stephen
Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005) (no. 04-57189).
54 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, sipranote6, § 11.06[A].
55 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3).
56 See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3) (2000); see also Rudell & Rosini, supranote 5, para. 17 ("Termination
of grants under [Section 304(c)] must have an effective date after the 56th year of copyright and
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termination generally may be effected under § 203 "at any time during a period
of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution
of the grant.""7 For transfers of renewal rights executed before 1978, termination
may be effected under § 304(c) "at any time during a period of five years
beginning at the end of fifty-six years from the date copyright was originally
secured," 8 and under § 304(d) "at any time during a period of five years beginning
at the end of seventy-five years from the date the copyright was originally
secured."59 Termination under both § 203 and 5 304 requires that formal notice
of termination be served between ten years and two years in advance of the date
upon which termination is to be effected.6 °
3. Who May Terminate Transfers. Under both § 203 and § 304, termination
rights belong to the author.6 If the author does not survive to the vesting of the
termination rights, his right to terminate passes to statutorily designated heirs.62
Termination rights of an author who predeceases their vesting are owned entirely
by the author's surviving spouse, unless there are also surviving issue, in which
case one-half of the author's termination interest is owned by the author's
surviving spouse and the other half is divided, per stirpes, among the author's
issue.63 If the author is survived by issue but not a spouse, the author's issue own

prior to the end of the 61st year of copyright in the relevant copyrighted work, without reference
to the date of the grant.").
57

17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3).

17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3). The "fifty-six years" in § 304(c) relates to the fifty-six-year copyright
term under the 1909 Act and is designed to allow authors and authors' heirs to benefit from the 1976
Act's nineteen-year extension. See supranote 43 and accompanying text.
59 17 U.S.C. § 304(d)(2). The "seventy-five years" in § 304(d) applies to copyrights which had
a term of fifty-six years under the 1909 Act, extended to seventy-five years by the 1976 Act, and then
extended another twenty years by the CTEA in 1998. See spranotes 44-46 and accompanying text.
Thus, the opportunity afforded by § 304(d) to terminate a pre-1978 transfer allows the author and
his heirs to enjoy, despite previously unused and expired § 304(c) termination rights, the CTEA's
additional twenty-year term extension. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
60 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, S 11.06[A].
61 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(1), 304(c)(1). The rules under § 203 and § 304 are different for works with
joint authors. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1) ("In the case of a grant executed by two or more
authors of a joint work, termination of the grant may be effected by a majority of the authors who
executed it."), with 17 U.S.C. § 3 04(c)(1) ("In the case of a grant executed by one or more of the
authors of the work, termination of the grant may be effected, to the extent of a particular author's
share in the ownership of the renewal copyright, by the author who executed it .. "). See NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 6, § 11.03[A][1] ("Grants executed by two or more joint authors prior to
January 1, 1978, are terminable by each executing joint author even if a majority of the executing
joint authors do not join in such termination. The termination is effective, however, only with
respect to the interest of the terminating join author.. .
62 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(2), 304(c)(2).
63 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2).
58
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the entirety of his termination interest, divided on a per stirpes basis.' After
October 27, 1998, if neither a spouse nor issue survive an author who predeceases
the vesting of the termination interest, the termination rights pass to the author's
"executor, administrator, personal representative, or trustee. 6 5 When an author's
termination interest has been divided among the author's statutory heirs, a
majority of the interest must be joined for the heirs to exercise their termination
rights. 66
Transfers of an author's copyright executed other than by the author are
subject to termination only if executed prior to 1978.67 In the case of a transfer
executed before 1978 by someone other than the author, "termination of that
68
grant may be effected by the surviving person or persons who executed it."
Persons who could have executed a transfer of the author's copyright, and who
therefore are able to terminate such a transfer made before 1978, include the
author's surviving spouse, children, executors, or next of kin.6 9
C. AN EMERGING SPLIT BETWEEN THE SECOND AND NINTH CIRCUITS: THE
ALIENABILITY OF COPYRIGHT TERMINATION RIGHTS

The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the termination provisions of the
Copyright Act and their interaction with state contract law has created tension
between Ninth Circuit courts and Second Circuit courts with respect to the
question of the alienability or inalienability of termination rights. In two Second
Circuit cases in the last decade-and-a-half, the court upheld, under different
factual situations, the right to exercise termination rights notwithstanding certain
agreements to the contrary, basing its holdings in part on a characterization of

64
65

Id.
17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2)(D); see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6,

§ 11.03[A][2][a]

(describing the harsh results of the 1975 Act, prior to the provisions of the 1998 amendment, in
which no one could exercise the termination rights after the author's death if the author left no
surviving spouse, children, or grandchildren).
6 17 U.S.C. %§ 203(a)(2)(C), 304(c)(2)(C); see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, §
11.03[A][2][b] ("If a grant is executed by an author who does not survive until the vesting of the
termination interest, a statutorily defined 'per stirpes majority' of those who succeed to the deceased
author's termination interest is entitled to terminate the grant.'). Because a fractionated termination
interest must be exercised "on a per stirpes basis," a majority of heirs will not necessarily represent
a majority of the interest. For example, if an author is survived by his spouse and two children, his
termination interest is divided among three people, one-half to the spouse and one-quarter to each
child. While the two children would constitute a majority of the author's heirs, they do not hold and
cannot exercise a majority of the inherited termination rights.
67 17 U.S.C. %§203 (a), 304(c)-(c)(I), 304(d); see supranotes 47-50 and accompanying text.
61 17 U.S.C. 304(c)(1).
69 17 U.S.C. %§203(b)(2), 304(c)(6)(B); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 11.03[B].
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termination rights as inalienable.7 ° Steinbeck v. McIntosh & Otis, Inc., a recent case
from the Southern District of New York, a district court within the Second
Circuit, built on this Second Circuit precedent by upholding the rights of an
authors' heirs to exercise their termination rights notwithstanding a post-transfer
agreement to the contrary.7'
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger,Inc., on
a different set of facts, narrowly construed the "inalienability" of termination
rights in holding that a particular post-transfer agreement precluded a family
72
member of a deceased author from exercising statutory termination rights.
ClassicMedia, Inc. v. Mewborn, a recent case from the Central District of California,
a district court within the Ninth Circuit, has already relied on the precedent set by
the Ninth Circuit in Milne.73
1. Second Circuit.
a. Marvel Characters (2002). The issue addressed by the Second Circuit
in Marvel Charactersv. Simon was "whether a settlement agreement, entered into
long after a work's creation, stipulating that a work was created for hire
constitutes 'any agreement to the contrary' under the 1976 Act. ' 74 Because this
case posed a question of first impression for the Second Circuit, the court closely
examined the language of the Copyright Act's termination provisions. 75 In doing
so, the court began to shape its stance on how easily termination rights could be
lost, transferred, or voluntarily forfeited through post-transfer agreements prior
to the vesting of the termination rights.
The controversy in Marvel Characterscentered around a comic book series
76
entitled Captain America Comics, authored by Joseph Simon and Jack Kirby.
According to Simon, he created Captain America independently as a freelance
project and orally assigned its story, character, and the second through tenth
issues (the Works) to Martin and Jean Goodman, doing business as Timely
Publications and Timely Comics, Inc. (Timely), predecessors in interest to Marvel
Characters, Inc. After publishing the second through tenth issues of Captain

71 See Larry Spier, Inc. v. Bourne Co., 953 F.2d 774, 779-80 (2d Cir. 1992); Marvel Characters,
Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 289-93 (2d Cir. 2002).
71 Steinbeck v. McIntosh & Otis, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
72 Milne ex reL Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036, 1042-48 (9th Cir. 2005).
73 Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewborn, No. CV05-452RGKSGLX, 2006 WL 3333715 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 9, 2006).
74Marvel Characters v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 2002).
71 Id.at 282, 289.
76

Id at 282.

77 Id.
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America Comics in 1941, Timely applied for and received registered copyrights for
each issue.78
In 1967, Simon filed suit in the Southern District of New York, seeking a
declaratory judgment that he had the sole and exclusive right to the renewal term
of the copyright for the Works. 79 The Goodmans and their affiliates denied
Simon was the sole author of the Works, arguing that Simon's contributions to
the CaptainAmerica Comicswere made as an "employee for hire," and that because
Timely owned the copyrights, Simon should be enjoined from applying to renew
them. 8° In 1969, the parties entered a settlement agreement in which Simon
acknowledged that his contribution to the Works "was done as an employee for
hire of the Goodmans" and assigned all his rights in the Works to the Goodmans
and their affiliates.8
In 1999, contrary to the settlement agreement, Simon filed notices of
termination with the Copyright Office claiming that he independently created the
Works as "neither an employee for hire nor a creator of a work for hire. '82 In
response, Marvel brought suit in the Southern District of New York, seeking a
declaratory judgment invalidating Simon's notices of termination.83 The district
court granted Marvel summary judgment, finding that Simon's unambiguous
acknowledgement in the settlement agreement that he created the Works "for
hire" prevented him from exercising his statutory termination rights under 17
U.S.C. § 304(c).84
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed that Simon's acknowledgement in the
settlement agreement was unambiguous, but found that fact irrelevant. 85 Instead,
the court focused on the language and legislative purpose of 17 U.S.C. 5 304(c),
which the Second Circuit interpreted as granting an inalienable right to terminate
according to statutory procedures, "notwithstanding any agreement to the
contrary."86 However, finding it unclear from the text of5 304(c)(5) whether "any

7sId
79

Id.

80Id.
"' Id.at 284.
82 Id. at 284-85.
83

Id.

Id.at 285.
s Id.at 289.
80 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5) (2000); see also Marvel Characters,310 F.3d at 282 ("Section 304(c) grants
14

authors (or if deceased, their statutory heirs) an inalienable right to terminate a grant in a copyright
fifty-six years after the original grant 'notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.'" (emphasis
added)). The Second Circuit first addressed the issue of the alienability of termination rights in Larry
Spier, Inc. v. Bourne Co., 953 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1992). In that case, Dave Dreyer's heirs transferred
Dreyer's copyrights to plaintiff Spier after terminating a transfer of the same copyrights from Dreyer
to defendant Bourne during Dreyer's life. Id at 776-77. Bourne argued that Dreyer's will's
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agreement to the contrary" included a settlement agreement stipulating a work
was created
for hire, the court turned to the statute's legislative intent and
7
purpose.

8

The court first looked to the Supreme Court's statements that the principal
purposes of the termination provisions were to provide added benefits to authors
and to relieve authors of the consequences of unremunerative grants, 88 as well as
that termination rights are inalienable. 89 The court then considered Congress's
intent to protect authors from unequal bargaining positions found in the
legislative history of the termination provisions.9" The court concluded that the
"clear Congressional purpose behind § 304(c) was to prevent authors from
waiving their termination rights by contract."'" Applying this construction to the
case at hand, the court held that "examining the legislative intent and purpose of
5 304(c), it becomes clear that an agreement made after a work's creation
stipulating that the work was created as a work for hire constitutes an 'agreement
to the contrary' which can be disavowed pursuant to the statute."9 2

purported devise of Dreyer's copyright interest to Dreyer's heirs prevented termination of Bourne's
grant. Id. at 777. However, the court found that no copyright interest actually passed by Dreyer's
will because Dreyer had already transferred all of his copyrights to Bourne during his life. Id.at 778.
Therefore, the court held that "the Dreyer family had the right, under the statute, to terminate the
1951 assignment [to Bourne] and recapture the renewal rights for the family." Id The Second
Circuit supported its holding with an interpretation of the statutory language and legislative intent
of 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) that emphasized the inalienability of an author's family's termination rights,
emphasizing that
in revising the copyright laws, an explicit provision to terminate the assignment
(that is, Section 304(c)) was drafted so as to leave no doubt about the family's
power to recapture the copyright .... Section 304(c)(5) expressly provides that
termination 'may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary,
including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant.'
Id. at 779-80.
17 See Marvel Characters, 310 F.3d at 290 (noting that "[w]hen the language of a statute is
unambiguous, 'judicial inquiry is complete,' " but that "[w]hen the terms of a statute are
ambiguous... we may seek guidance in the legislative history and purpose of the statute").
88 See id. ("The Supreme Court has elucidated the intent and purpose behind the termination
provision of the 1976 Act: 'The principal purpose of the amendments in § 304 was to provide added
benefit to authors. The... concept of a termination right itself, w[as] obviously intended to make
the rewards for the creativity of authors more substantial. More particularly, the termination right
was expressly intended to relieve authors of the consequences of ill-advised and unremunerative
grants that had been made before the author had a fair opportunity to appreciate the true value of
his work product.' " (quoting Mile Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1985))).
'9 See id. (" 'The 1976 Copyright Act provides ... an inalienable termination right.' " (quoting
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990))).
90See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprintedin1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5740).
91 Id.
92 Id.
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b. Steinbeck (S.D.N.Y 2006). Recently, the Southern District of New
York applied the Second Circuit's interpretation of termination rights as
inalienable in Steinbeck v. McIntosh & Otis, Inc.93 Steinbeck involved the termination94
rights to Nobel and Pulitzer Prize winner John Steinbeck's copyrighted works.
These works were divided into two categories: the "early works," which consisted
of those works for which Steinbeck filed renewal copyright registrations during
his lifetime, and the "late works," which did not enter their renewal period until
after John Steinbeck's death in 1968." During his life, Steinbeck made several
transfers of his copyrights, including a transfer in 1938 (the 1938 Agreement) to
The Viking Press, Inc., the predecessor of Penguin Group (USA) Inc., which
included the exclusive publishing rights to one of his early works, The Long
Vallqy. 96 The 1938 Agreement covered several other important works, including
Tortilla Flat,OfMice and Men, The Red Pony, and The Grapes of Wrath.97
Upon Steinbeck's death in 1968, his will devised the copyrights to his early
works to his third wife and widow, Elaine. 98 In 1994, Elaine, as owner of the
copyrights, entered into an agreement (the 1994 Agreement) with Penguin by
which Penguin retained the same rights of publication as it held under the 1938
Agreement, but at an increased price. 99 Because termination rights are not tied to
the devise of the underlying copyrights, but are instead inherited according to a
statutory scheme, Steinbeck's two sons from his second marriage, Thomas and
John IV, each inherited a quarter of the termination rights, despite taking no
interest in the copyrights under Steinbeck's will.'0° Thus, Elaine held 50% of the
termination rights and Thomas and John IV collectively held the other 50%."'
Because no agreement could be reached to achieve the requisite 51% majority of
interest, 1°2 the termination rights to John Steinbeck's works remained in a
deadlock for over two decades. 03

93 Steinbeck

v. McIntosh & Otis, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

' Id at 399. The list of works involved in the Steinbeck case contains twenty-seven tides. Id. at
nn.12-13.
9' Id. at nn.12-13.
96 Id. at 400.
9' See id. at 400-01 ("By its terms the 1938 Agreement 'supersede[d] all previous agreements
made between The Viking Press, Inc. and John Steinbeck,' and also applied to 'all the previously
published books of John Steinbeck,'.... Four additional works by Steinbeck were added to the
1938 Agreement by way of its option clause, including The Grapesof Wrath...
98 Id.at 401.
99Id at n.16.
100 Id

at 399-400.

Id
102 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
103 Steinbeck, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 400.
101
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During this time, John IV died, survived by only one child, Blake Smyle. °4
When Elaine died in 2003, Thomas and Blake possessed not only the majority of
Steinbeck's termination interest, but in fact all of it.' In May and June of 2004,
Thomas and Blake served notices of termination for five different grants made
by Steinbeck during his life. 0 6 The subsequent objections from various grantees
led to a consolidated action before the Southern District of New York on the
parties' cross motions for summary judgment as to the validity of the termination
10 7
notices.

The Penguin Termination Notice (Notice) was served to terminate the 1938
Agreement."0 ' The defendants argued that the Notice was invalid because the
1994 Agreement superseded the 1938 Agreement, "effectively transform[ing]
Steinbeck's pre-1978 grant into a 'new' grant of copyright, executed on or after
January 1, 1978, and as such,. . . not subject to termination under Section 304."'0 9
In rejecting the defendants' argument, the trial court first made clear its
position that termination rights were inalienable and remained so until exercised
by the service of a notice of termination."0 The court described 5 304(c) as
granting "creators of pre-1978 works or their statutory heirs an inchoate but
inalienable property right to 'terminate' earlier grants of copyrights.""' As
support for this proposition, the court cited the Supreme Court in Stewart v.
Abend,' 2 the Second Circuit in Boume,1 3 and the statutory language of the
Copyright Act." 4 The district court emphasized the importance of § 304(c)(5) in

104

Id.

105Id.
106 Id. The notices purported to terminate five grants: a grant of book publishing rights made
in 1938 to the predecessor of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.; grants of the motion picture rights to The
Red Pony made in 1946, 1947, and 1949 to Paramount Pictures, Inc.; grants of the motion picture
rights to The Long Valley made in 1946, 1947, and 1949 to Paramount Pictures; a grant of the
theatrical rights to Canney Row made in 1956 to Rogers & Hammerstein and MGM; and a grant of
the motion picture rights to The Wayward Bus made in 1949 to Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corporation. Id.
107 Id

at 399.

108 Id at 401.
SId. at 401.
110 Id at 397-99.

, Id at 397. The court's description of the termination right as "inchoate" likely refers to the
fact that "[t]ermination rights vest on the date a notice of termination is served." Id.at 398.
112 Id at n.4 ('The 1976 Copyright Act... provides an inalienable termination right." (quoting
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990))).
113 See id. ("Section 304(c) 'was drafted so as to leave no doubt about the family's power to
recapture the copyright.' " (quoting Larry Spier, Inc. v. Bourne Co., 953 F.2d 774, 779-80 (2d Cir.
1992))).
114 See id.
(supporting its statement that "[t]ermination rights remain inalienable until they are
exercised by service of a notice of termination" by citing 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(B) and 17 U.S.C. §
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enforcing the inalienability of termination rights" 5 and explained that the
provision "is intended to be broadly applied to ...liberally protect termination
rights""' 6 and to prevent authors or their heirs from contracting away "this
for the years of extended protection any pre-1978
absolute right to' 'recapture'
17
"
grant."
copyright
The court rejected the defendants' argument that the 1994 Agreement
cancelled and superseded the 1938 Agreement, holding that "[t]he 1938
Agreement was author Steinbeck's exclusive grant of publication rights to
Penguin's predecessor.., so they unquestionably were within the terms of the
subsequently-enacted termination statute. ' 18 The court explained that
[T]his [1938] grant of publication rights is terminable because it is
a "copyright subsisting in either its first or renewal term on January
1, 1978,... [and is] the exclusive... grant of a transfer or license
of the renewal copyright or any right under it,executed before
January 1, 1978, by [the living author of such work], otherwise than
by will [here, by contract] ....
Beyond providing this statutory basis for its holding, the court acknowledged the
absurdity of the defendant's argument, which asserted that "the 1994 Agreement
extinguished the very termination right that it expressly acknowledges both exists
and flows from the 1930s copyrights.' 20
Finally, the court pointed out that if the 1994 Agreement had, either by its
effect or by its express provisions, worked to disinherit Elaine, Thomas, Blake,
or any other statutory heir, it would be void as an "agreement to the contrary.''
While the 1994 Agreement did not claim, by its express terms, to transfer or
relinquish Elaine's or anyone else's termination rights, the court noted that if it
had, "any such contractual language that purports to affect inalienable termination
interest would run afoul of black-letter copyright law.' ' 122 Further, the court
avowed that any effect of the 1994 Agreement that would render Thomas and

304(c)(6)(D)).
15 See id.at 399 ("To protect this [termination] right and prevent creators or statutory heirs from
contracting away, for whatever reason, this absolute right... the statute declares void any contract
the effect of which is in contravention of or which negates either of these termination rights.").
116 Id. at n.10.
117 Id. at 399.
118 Id. at 401.
119 Id. at n.20 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2000)).
120 Id. at 401.
121 Id. at 402.
'22 Id. at

n.23.
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Blake unable to exercise their termination rights would be contrary to both the
23
statutory language and the legislative history of the termination provisions.
Allowing the effect of the 1994 Agreement to preclude the exercise of termination
rights would violate the language of the termination provisions because "to the
extent that the 1994 Agreement would strip Thom and Blake . . . of their
inalienable termination rights in the pre-1978 grants, it is voidasan 'agreementto the
contrag'pursuantto 17 U.S.C ff 304(c)(5).'" 124 The court also noted that giving the
1994 Agreement such an effect would contravene the legislative intent of the
termination provisions, stating that "[a] ny interpretation of the 1994 Agreement
having the effect of disinheriting the statutory heirs to the termination interest...
in favor of Elaine's heirs must be set aside as contragy to the very purpose of the
terminationstatute, which protects children and grandchildren [of authors], and not
125
just widows."'
2. Ninth Circuit: Milne (2005). In Milne, the Ninth Circuit described its
interpretation of the scope of the inalienability of the Copyright Act's termination
rights.2 6 Milne dealt with the issue of whether a renegotiated agreement entered
into in 1983 (the 1983 Agreement) replaced the original 1930 and 1961 transfers
such that the copyright transfers would be classified as occurring after 1978 and
thus out of reach of the CTEA's termination provisions, 27 or whether the 1983
agreement constituted an "agreement to the contrary"'128 such that, pursuant to
the statute, the 1983 Agreement could not prevent otherwise valid termination. 9
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding.
The CTEA's termination provision does not apply to post-1978
agreements such as the parties' 1983 agreement, which continues to
control the parties' rights and royalty shares in the Pooh works. In
addition, Clare is unable to show that the 1983 agreement
constitutes an "agreement to the contrary" under section 304(c)(5),
and thus the courts cannot disregard the 1983 agreement....131

123 Id. at

402.
at 402 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5) (2000)) (emphasis added).
125 Id. at n.23.
126 Milne ex reL Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005).
12 See 17 U.S.C. § 304(d).
1-s 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5).
129 See Milne, 430 F.3d at 1041 ("The district court asked the question that lies at the very heart
124 Id

of the parties' dispute: 'Should the 1983 SSI Agreement be treated as a pre-1978 agreement to be
governed by the [CTEA's] termination provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 304?' ").
130 Id. at 1048.
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Alan Alexander Milne (Milne) was the creator of Winnie-the-Pooh.13 ' In 1930,
Milne granted to Stephen Slesinger (Slesinger), predecessor-in-interest to Stephen
Slesinger, Inc. (SSI), the exclusive merchandising and other rights to the Pooh
works in the United States and Canada during the initial and renewal terms of the
132
copyrights.
Upon Milne's death in 1956, his will bequeathed all of his interests in the Pooh
works to a trust (the Milne Trust) for the benefit of his widow during her
lifetime. 133 In 1961, SSI granted to Walt Disney Productions (Disney) the rights
that SSI had acquired through the 1930 grant from Milne. 134 Disney also entered
into an agreement with the author's widow and the Milne Trust, which granted
Disney certain exclusive rights in the Pooh works, including motion-picture rights
and foreign-merchandising rights. 135 In 1972, after the death of Milne's widow,
her interest in the copyrights and the royalties under the Milne Trust was
assigned, in accordance with Milne's will, to the Pooh Properties Trust. 136 The
beneficiaries of the Pooh Properties Trust included Milne's surviving son,
Christopher Robin Milne (Christopher), and Christopher's daughter, Clare Milne
137
(Clare).
In 1983, Disney confronted the possibility that Christopher might seek to
terminate the rights that Disney had received in 1961 from SSI. 13 8 According to
the Ninth Circuit, Disney sought to preempt this possibility by proposing that the
parties "renegotiate the rights to the Pooh works."' 39 The court characterized
Christopher Milne's participation in the "renegotiation" as "using the bargaining
power conferred by his termination right" to negotiate and sign on April 1, 1983,
a "more lucrative deal with SSI and Disney that would benefit the Pooh
Properties Trust and its beneficiaries."'" The 1983 Agreement revoked the 1930
and 1961 grants and immediately replaced them with a regranting of the same
interests. 1 ' The 1983 Agreement declared that "[t]he Trustees hereby assign,
grant, and set over unto [SSI] all of the rights in and to [the Pooh works] which

131
132
133

Id. at 1039.
Id.
Id.

134 Id. at
135
136

1040.

Id.
Id.

137Id. at

1040. Clare was Milne's only grandchild. Id. at 1039.
3 Id. In 1983, the five-year window during which Milne's 1930 grant to Slesinger (predecessor
in interest of SSI and Disney) could be terminated under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) was only years away.
See 17 U.S.C. 304(c)(3) (2000) ("Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period
of five years beginning at the end of fifty-six years from the date copyright was originally secured.").
139 Mi/ne, 430 F.3d at 1040.
140 Id
141 Id. at n.4.
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were transferred to [Slesinger by virtue of the 1930 grant.]1 4 2 The 1983
Agreement recited that "disputes had existed" and that the 1983 Agreement
served to "clarify certain aspects of [the parties] contractual arrangements and to
settle revised agreements."' '4 3 Further, in the 1983 Agreement, Christopher
purported to relinquish his right to seek termination of the previous transfers in
exchange for an increase in royalties.'"
In November 2004, Clare served SSI with a notice of termination for the 1930
grant by Milne to Slesinger and brought suit, seeking a declaration that the
termination notice was valid and effective in terminating SSI's rights in the Pooh
works. 14 However, the district court found that Clare's termination notice was
invalid.'" The court favored SSI's argument and held that the 1983 Agreement
between Christopher, SSI, and Disney was a new contract that revoked the 1930
grant, which Clare's notice sought to terminate, and that the 1983 Agreement was
not subject to termination under the Copyright Act. 41 The district court rejected
Clare's argument that the 1983 agreement was merely an extension of the 1930
grant.'4 8 Furthermore, the court held that § 304(c) was not applicable because the
1983 Agreement was not made prior to 1978 and that § 203(a) was not applicable
because the 1983 Agreement was not made by the author. 49 In addition, the
court noted that the 1983 Agreement "was created in order to protect SSI and
Disney from a termination of the rights granted to them" and that the Copyright
Act did not alter the power of private parties to contract. 50
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Clare argued that in light of § 304(c)(5), the
court should consider the 1983 Agreement to be an "agreement to the contrary"
that could not prevent Clare from exercising her termination rights as to the 1930
52
grant.' Clare cited as support both the Supreme Court case, Stewart v. Abend,"
5
and the Second Circuit case, MarvelCharacters.' 1 Clare argued that in Stewart the
Supreme Court held that "Congress intended to make the termination right

142

Id

143 Id.

See id. ("The Pooh Properties Trust now received double SSI's share of the royalties,
compared to about half of SSI's share before the 1983 agreement. Thus, the renegotiations between
the parties resulted, in some estimates, in a net gain of hundreds of millions of dollars to the Pooh
Properties Trust.").
141 Id at 1041.
146 Id. at 1042.
147 Id.

141

Id. at 1041.

149 Id. at 1042.
"0 Id at 1041-42.
"s Id. at 1043.

,52 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
113 Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002).
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inalienable for authors and their families."'" Furthermore, Clare argued that
Marvel Charactersalso "support[ed] her claim that the 1983 agreement [was] an
'agreement to the contrary' under section 304(c)(5)."' 55 Finally, Clare asserted that
the district court, in arriving at a contrary interpretation of § 304(c)(5),
inappropriately used legislative history to override the statute's clear meaning." 6
The Ninth Circuit, in holding that the 1930 grant "was terminated by the
beneficiaries of the Pooh Properties Trust upon execution of the 1983
agreement," emphatically rejected Clare's arguments based on § 304(c)(5)." 7 In
broad, blanket terms, the court declared that "[q]uite simply, there is no principle
of logic, canon of statutory construction, or consideration of fairness that
supports Clare's reading of the CTEA."' s To support this sweeping statement,
the court systematically rejected Clare's § 30 4 (c)(5) argument, denying first its
grounding in the statute, then distinguishing other judicial interpretations, and
finally, employing language from the legislative history of the 1976 Act. 9
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Copyright Act did not define the
phrase "agreement to the contrary," but the court noted that the statute provided
two examples of agreements that would constitute an "agreement to the
contrary": "'an agreement to make a will' and an agreement 'to make any future
grant.' ,160 Citing the principle that "[w]hen a statute contains ... specific items
and a general item, we usually deem the general item to be of the same category
or class as the more specifically enumerated items, ' 1 61 the court determined that
because the 1983 Agreement did not fall into either of the
two example categories,
62
it did not constitute "an agreement to the contrary."'
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Clare's reliance on StewartandMarvelCharacters
as support for her § 304(c)(5) argument.1 63 The Ninth Circuit declared that
"Stewart does not support the broad 'plain meaning' that Clare attributes to
section 304(c)(5).' ' 1 4 The court distinguished Stewarton narrow grounds, noting
that the case did not specifically interpret the language of § 304(c)(5) or §
203(a) (5).165
Further, the court deemed Clare's interpretation of Stewart

154

Milne, 430 F.3d at 1043.

155

Id

156

Id. at 1045.

"' Id. at 1042.
158 Id at 1043-47.
159 Id. at 1047.
160 Id at 1043 (quoting 17 U.S.C. 5 304(c)(5) (2000)).
161 Id at 1043 (quoting Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 834 (9th Cir.

1999)).
162
163
'6'
165

Id
Id. at 1043-44.
Id. at 1043.
See id Rather, the issue addressed in Stewart focused on derivative works and reversion of
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unfounded because the "only" discussion pertaining to inalienability in Stewart
involved the Supreme Court's statement that" '[t]he 1976 Copyright Act provides
a single, fixed term, but provides an inalienable termination right.' ,166
As to Clare's reliance on Marvel Characters,the Ninth Circuit distinguished that
case, confining Marvel Characters to its specific holding that a settlement
agreement, entered after a work's creation and stipulating that the work was
1 67
created for hire, constitutes an "agreement to the contrary" under the 1976 Act.
The court reasoned that "[t] he facts, reasoning and holding of Marvel have little
relevance to this case because, here, there is no after-the-fact attempt to
recharacterize the work or a prior agreement.' ' 68 Unlike the settlement agreement
in Marvel Characters,which purported to retroactively alter the positions of the
parties, the Ninth Circuit characterized the 1983 Agreement as containing
"contractual provisions that operated prospectively through the revocation of an
existing grant and the making of a new one.' 1 69 The court pointed to the
agreement's express revocation and replacement of the 1930 grant with a grant
that was more lucrative for the Pooh Properties Trust and the author's heirs, as
well as the parties's description of the 1983 Agreement as a "new agreementfor
thefuturewhich the parties believe would not be subject to any right of termination
inder 17 U.S.C. Secs. 203 or 304(c)."' 7 °
Like the Second Circuit in Marvel Characters, the Ninth Circuit in Milne also
looked to the legislative history to support its holding. The Ninth Circuit cited
Congress's statements that nothing in the Copyright Act was intended to change
contract law respecting when an author may otherwise terminate a license,
transfer, or assignment,' 7' and specifically, that Congress did not intend for the
statute to "prevent the parties to a transfer or license from voluntarily agreeing at
any time to terminate an existing grant and negotiat[e] a new one. '' 17 Therefore,
the Ninth Court reasoned that "the 1983 agreement exemplifies the increased
bargaining power that Congress intended to bestow on authors and their heirs by

rights under the 1909 Copyright Act. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 211 (1990). Under the 1909
Act, if an author pre-deceased the commencement of the renewal period for his copyrights, the
renewal rights reverted to his statutory heirs. Id. at 219. Stewart held that in such a situation the
owner of a derivative work, while perhaps properly licensed by the deceased author before his death,
could not continue to exploit the derivative work without infringing upon the rights of the statutory
heirs who owned the renewal rights after reversion. Id. at 220-21.
166 Milne, 430 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Stewart, 495 U.S. at 230).
167 Id at 1043-44.
168

Id. at 1044.

169

id.

170 Id.
171 Id. at 1045 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 127 (1976), reprintedin1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5743); supra note 19.
172 Id. at 1046 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 142).
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creating the termination right under the 1976 Copyright Act."'173 As described by
the court, Christopher "perceived the right to terminate as a valuable bargaining
chip 1 74 and, instead of serving a termination notice, elected to "use his leverage"
to "obtain an advantageous agreement that doubled its royalty share relative to
SSI's share.' '17s According to the court, because Clare benefited monetarily from
the 1983 Agreement that her father "renegotiated," her "current dissatisfaction"
76
with the arrangement provided no basis for invalidating the 1983 Agreement.
Thus, the court found that because "the 1983 agreement appears to be the type
expressly contemplated and endorsed by Congress, we do not consider it to be a
prohibited 'agreement to the contrary' under section 304(c)(5).' 77
After the Ninth Circuit decided Milne, Clare filed a petition of certiorari with
the Supreme Court.1'7 After accepting briefs from Milne and SSI, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in June of 2006.79
III. ANALYSIS
The cases described above illustrate the growing division between the Second
and Ninth Circuits in their interpretation of the statutory language and legislative
intent of the Copyright Act's termination provisions, and in their willingness to
apply those provisions to invalidate contractual agreements. The Ninth Circuit
inMilne employed a very narrow interpretation of S 304(c)(5) that significantly
limited the provisions' effect on general contract law principles.'
The Second
Circuit cases, including a recent Southern District of New York opinion, however,
exhibit a broader reading of § 304(c)(5) and call for a more liberal application of
the termination provisions to invalidate agreements that prevent the exercise of
81
termination rights.'
Initially, this Part will address the role of the Steinbeck case in demonstrating
the emergence, importance, and future significance of the circuit split between the
Second and Ninth Circuits. This Part will then analyze each circuit's method of
interpreting § 304(c)(5) and applying that provision to contractual arrangements
that purport to prevent the exercise of termination rights. Next, this Part will

173 Id.
174
175
176
177
178

Id.
Id. at 1045-46.
Id. at 1045.
Id. at 1046.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Milne ex eLCoyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2969

(2006) (No. 05-1332).
179 Milner ex tel.
Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2969 (2006) (mem.).
180 See supra Part II.c.2.
181 See supra Part II.C. 1.
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examine the Second and Ninth Circuits' constructions of the language of
§ 304(c) (5) and the legislative purposes underlying that statutory provision. Then,
this Part will evaluate the application of each circuit's approach in light of
considerations of fairness, logical consistency, and the need to establish an
administrable legal standard.
This Part will argue that the Second Circuit's interpretation of § 304(c)(5) as
broadly prohibiting any alienation of termination rights is more faithful to the
language of the termination provisions than the Ninth Circuit's restrictive
approach. As support for this position, this Part will highlight the Ninth Circuit's
strained statutory construction in Milne, its inappropriate use of legislative history
in that case, and the difficulties of utilizing Milne as an administrable legal
standard. Finally, this Part will emphasize the importance of resolving the current
circuit split and recommend that the Supreme Court resolve the split by endorsing
the approach of the Second Circuit.
A. STEINBECK AND THE EMERGING SPLIT BETWEEN THE SECOND AND NINTH
CIRCUITS

1! The recent Southern District of New York decision in Steinbeck, although not
an appellate decision, is very relevant to the analysis of the split between the
Second and Ninth Circuits. Steinbeck helps illustrate the existence of a genuine
and material conflict between the Second and Ninth circuits' interpretation and
application of the copyright termination provisions1 82 Because the facts in the

" In its Brief in Opposition to Clare's petition for certiorari, SSI argued that the Steinbeck
decision does not create a circuit conflict. In addition to arguing that Steinbeck is only a district court
decision and that there are some technically distinguishing facts, SSI also attempted to dismiss the
Steinbeck as a case of mere contract interpretation. See Brief in Opposition at 2, Milne ex rel Coyne
v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2969, No. 05-1332 (2006) [hereinafter Brief in Opposition].
Such a characterization simplifies and distorts the court's reasoning and holding. While the court
noted the absurdity of defendant's argument that the 1994 Agreement, which expressly
acknowledged the existence and continuation of Elaine's termination tights, erased those rights, this
was not the court's sole reasoning. Specifically, the court found that
The 1938 Agreement was author Steinbeck's exclusive grant of publication rights
to Penguin's predecessor.., so they unquestionably were within the terms of the
subsequently-enacted termination statute .... This [1938] grant of publication
rights is terminable because it is a "copyright subsisting in either its first or
renewal term onJanuary 1, 1978,... [and is] the exclusive.., grant of a transfer
or license of the renewal copyright... executed before January 1, 1978, by [the
living author of such work], otherwise than by will [here, by contract]
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)).
Steinbeck v. McIntosh & Otis, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Thus, the Steinbeck
decision involved interpretation and application of the statutory termination provisions and was not
simply based on "interpretation of the contract." Brief in Opposition, supra, at 2.
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Steinbeck case are more analogous to the facts in Milne than are the facts of Bourne
or Marvel Characters, a comparison between Steinbeck and Milne exhibits more
plainly the conflict between the two circuits' developing law on the alienation of
termination rights.
In both Milne and Steinbeck, the defendants argued that an agreement executed
between the defendant and an heir of the author, made subsequent to the author's
original grant to the defendant and after January 1, 1978, precluded the author's
heirs from exercising their termination rights.'83 In both cases, the transferees
argued that the agreement entered by the author's heir was a new, independent
"transfer" that superseded the author's original grant, and because transfers made
on or after January 1, 1978 are terminable only if they were executed by the
author, no terminable transfer remained.' Also, in both cases, the agreements
at issue expressly acknowledged the existence of the termination rights. In Milne,
Christopher expressly agreed in the contract to relinquish his right to seek
termination of previous transfers. 5 In Steinbeck, the contract at issue affirmed the
existence and continuation of the family's termination right." 6 In Milne, the Ninth
Circuit found the voluntary relinquishment of Christopher's termination rights to
be valid under state contract law and not invalidated under the termination
provisions." 7 By contrast, in the view of the Southern District of New York,
which was applying Second Circuit precedent, whether or not the contract's terms
provided for the continuation of termination rights or for their voluntary
relinquishment, if a contract had the effect of disinheriting the author's family of
its inalienable termination right, that contract was void pursuant to the
termination provisions.' 8 Thus, when the Second Circuit's interpretation and
manner of applying the termination provisions is projected onto the Steinbeck
facts, which closely parallel the facts of Milne, the genuine conflict that exists
between the two circuits is made clear.
B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S BROAD INTERPRETATION OF 5 304(c)(5) IS MORE
FAITHFUL TO THE STATUTE'S LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY THAN THE
NINTH CIRCUIT'S NARROW READING

Between the divergent positions of the two circuits on the alienability of
termination rights, the Second Circuit's interpretation that § 304(c)(5) broadly

183 See supra notes 109, 147 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 109, 147 and accompanying text.
185

See supra note 144 and accompanying text.

18 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
187
188

See supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
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prohibits agreements that prevent the exercise of termination rights is more
faithful to the language and legislative history of the termination provisions than
the Ninth Circuit's narrow reading. In Marvel Characters, the Second Circuit
interpreted 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) in favor of the author's right to terminate.'89 The
court relied on legislative history and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
termination provisions to determine that the purpose of 5 304(c)(5) was "to
prevent authors from waiving their termination right by contract."'9 ° Reading the
statute in light of this purpose, the court determined that a settlement agreement,
19
though not an agreement to make a will or an agreement to make a future grant,
nonetheless constituted an "agreement to the contrary" that could not prevent an
otherwise valid exercise of termination rights.'92
In Steinbeck, the Southern District of New York, applying the Second Circuit
precedent set in Bourne and Marvel Characters,interpreted § 304(c)(5) to require
rejection of the contention that the 1994 Agreement prevented the author's
family's exercise of their termination rights.' 93 The court emphasized the wide
reach and decisive impact of the termination provisions on any contract
interfering with termination rights, stating that "[t]o protect this [termination]
right and prevent creators or statutory heirs from contracting away, for whatever
reason, this absolute right.., the statute declares void any contract the effect of
which is in contravention of or which negates either of these termination
rights."' 94 In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's attempts to limit the termination
provisions' effect on the individual's right to contract, the Steinbeck court accepted
the practical result of the termination provisions. In that regard, the Steinbeck
court stated, "Indeed, copyright termination abrogates freedom of contract in two
ways: it allows for the invalidation of the original contractual transfer, and it
abrogates subsequent attempts to contract around the termination right it
' 95
creates."'
These Second Circuit courts' interpretation of § 304(c) (5) is supported by the
statute's language, the legislative history, and passages from Supreme Court
opinions that describe the nature or purpose of termination rights. The
"notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary" language of § 304(c)(5) lends
itself, facially, to a very broad interpretation. However, the Second Circuit courts
did not rely on the provision's language alone, but construed it in light of the
189 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
190

See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.

191See 17 U.S.C. 304(c)(5) (2000) ("Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding

any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant.").
192 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
193 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
194

See supra note 115.

195 Steinbeck v. McIntosh & Otis, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 395, 399 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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statutory purpose of preventing authors from waiving their termination rights by
contract, even voluntarily. 196 Such a construction of the statute's purpose finds
support in the House Report for the 1976 Act,' 97 as well as in the Supreme
Court's description of the legislative purpose of termination rights in Mills
Music.

198

Further, despite the Ninth Circuit's rejection of a similar argument in Milne,
the Second Circuit courts' interpretation also draws at least some support from
the Supreme Court's opinion in Stewart v. Abend.199 In Milne, the Ninth Circuit
rejected Clare's use of Stewartto support her argument that termination rights are
inalienable, claiming that Stewart did not directly confront the issue of the
alienability of termination rights.2" The Ninth Circuit indicated that the Supreme
Court's one-time description in Stewart of termination rights as "inalienable" had
no value as precedent and "[did] not support the broad 'plain meaning' that Clare
attribute[d] to section 304(c)(5)." 2"' While strictly speaking, Stewart may have no
precedential value as to the inalienability of termination rights, the Supreme
Court's statement that "[t]he 1976 Copyright Act . . .provides an inalienable
termination right" in the Court's short background recitation of the "evolution
of the duration of copyright protection"'2 2 likely bears some relevance to the
assertion that termination rights were intended to be inalienable. Even if not
binding, the Supreme Court's description of termination rights as "inalienable"
warrants more attention than the summary dismissal it was given by the Ninth
Circuit.
Standing in stark contrast to the Second Circuit's tendency to read rather
broadly the inalienability of termination rights is the Ninth Circuit's very narrow
interpretation of 5 304(c)(5). In Milne, the Ninth Circuit limited the language of
the statute to prohibit only certain kinds of contractual alienation of termination
rights." 3 Applying a principle of statutory construction, the Ninth Circuit
determined that because the 1983 Agreement was neither an agreement to make
a will nor an agreement to make a future grant, the 1983 Agreement could not be
regarded as an "agreement to the contrary" pursuant to § 304(c)(5). 2°
The interpretation that only agreements to make a will or a future grant can
be regarded as "agreements to the contrary" under § 304(c)(5) stands in sharp

196 See supra notes 87, 91-92, 115-17, 125 and accompanying text.

9 See supra notes 22, 24 and accompanying text.
9 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
199Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990).
200 See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
201 See supra text accompanying note 164.
202 Stewart, 495 U.S. at 230.
" See spra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.

204
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contrast to the Second Circuit's holding that the settlement agreement in Marvel
Charactersqualified as an "agreement to the contrary."2 ' Further, the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation defies the natural and logical meaning of the statute. The
Ninth Circuit limits "notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an
agreement to make a will or to make any future grant '' 2° 6 to mean
"notwithstanding any agreement to make a will or to make any future grant." The
court ignores the explicitly broad qualifier "any" and completely alters the
meaning of "including," which is explicitly defined for its use in Title 17 of the
U.S. Code as an illustrative, rather than a limitative, term.207 In light of that
definition, the Second Circuit's broader interpretation of "any agreement" is more
faithful to the prescribed meaning of the term "including."
Like the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit also sought to support its statutory
construction with language cited from the legislative history. The Ninth Circuit
relied on a phrase in the House Report for the 1976 Act that stated that Congress
did not intend for the statute to "prevent the parties to a transfer or license from
voluntarily agreeing at any time to terminate an existing grant and negotiate a new
one." ' While the Ninth Circuit acknowledged in a footnote that this particular
statement actually referred to § 203, and not § 304(c), which was at issue in the
Milne case, the court nonetheless erroneously relied on it, claiming that "[t]o the
extent that the legislative record references section 304(c)(5)'s counterpart
provision under section 203(a)(5), we find that history instructive given Congress'
use of identical language in both provisions. 2 9
However, the cited Congressional language, when quoted in full, actually says:
"Section 203 would not prevent the parties to a transfer or license from
voluntarily agreeing at any time to terminate an existing grant and negotiating a
new one, thereby causinganother35yearperiodto startrunning. 210 As is plain from the
entire statement, there is a clear distinction between the operation of § 304(c) and
the operation of § 203 that prevents the reasoning in the quoted legislative history
from applying equally to both provisions. Because the window for termination
of a transfer under § 304(c) is tied to the date of the copyright, while the window
for termination under § 203 is tied to the date of the transfer,21' voluntarily agreeing

205 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.

20617 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5) (2000) (emphasis added).
207See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Except as otherwise provided in this tide, as used in this title, the
following terms and their variant forms mean the following: ...The terms 'including' and 'such as'

are illustrative and not limitative.").
208See supra note 171-72 and accompanying text.
Milne ex reL Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036, 1046 n.9 (9th Cir. 2005).
210H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 127 (1976), repinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5743 (emphasis
added).
211

See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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to terminate an existing grant and replace it with a new one would have different
effects under each section. Under § 203, as stated in the House Report,
terminating an existing grant of copyrights and replacing it with a new one would
not extinguish the termination right, but rather would reset the thirty-five year
clock at the date of the new transfer, merely delaying the exercise of termination
rights thirty-five more years. However, as illustrated in Milne itself, because the
window for termination under § 304(c) does not move with the date of the
transfer, and because there is a temporal limit set on the latest possible grant
terminable under § 304 (December 31,1977),212 a replacementofa pre-1978 transfer
with a new agreement afterJanuary 1, 1978 would effectively prevent any exercise
of a termination right under 5 304(c). Thus, the legislative history cited by the
Ninth Circuit in Milne cannot be used to support its holding.
C. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S LIBERAL APPLICATION OF § 304(C)(5) LEADS TO MORE
FAIR AND CONSISTENT RESULTS AND ESTABLISHES A MORE WORKABLE LEGAL
STANDARD THAN THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S RESTRICTIVE APPROACH

The Second Circuit's broad interpretation of "any agreement" in § 304(c)(5)
results in a more liberal application of that provision to prohibit agreements that
prevent the exercise of termination rights. The Second Circuit approach creates
results that are more fair and consistent, as well as a standard that is more
practical to apply. First, the limited effect given to S 304(c)(5) by the Ninth
Circuit has allowed a contract executed by one heir to affect the termination rights
of another. This result is less fair than the result reached by the Second Circuit's
strict adherence to the language of the termination provisions. Theoretically,
under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, one individual heir could execute an
agreement that would disinherit any number of other heirs of their interest in the
termination rights-perhaps even preventing some or all of those other heirs
from receiving any benefit under the individual heir's new agreement. In contrast,
the termination provisions require action by a majority of a divided interest in
termination rights in order to effect termination, and provide that all holders of
a termination interest share in the reverted interest, regardless of whether they
joined in the majority that exercised the right.213 Further, to the extent that the
Ninth Circuit bases its conclusion on the view that the termination provisions
have no limiting effect on an individual's right to contract, its reasoning results in
a logical inconsistency because allowing one heir to use his termination rights as

212
213

17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2000).
See supra note 66 and accompanying text; see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 11.04

("Anyone who had the right to terminate a given grant, not just someone who in fact joined in
requesting the termination, will own the rights thus terminated ... .
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a bargaining tool to negotiate a post-transfer contract completely deprives other
heirs of their ability to similarly use their termination rights as a basis for
negotiating their own bargains.
These same weaknesses also render it difficult to administer a practical legal
standard derived from the Ninth Circuit's decision in Milne. Even if the Milne
case were construed more narrowly so as to prevent the unfair and inconsistent
results described above, the resulting standard would still be difficult to apply.
One could limit Milne to upholding voluntary agreements that result in the
relinquishment or alienation of termination rights only where all owners of
interest in the termination rights benefit from the agreement, or only where their
benefit is equivalent to that which they would have received if the termination
rights had been exercised. However, both standards would require an additional
threshold inquiry as to the determinable benefits received by all of the author's
statutory heirs, and in the latter case would also require a very speculative
evaluation of whether or not such benefits are equivalent to what the heirs would
have received through the formal exercise of their termination rights. By contrast,
the Second Circuit's literal interpretation of the § 304(c)(5) language and liberal
application of that provision to any agreement that prevents the exercise of
termination rights establishes a much more consistent legal standard, which is
easier to apply.
As more transfers enter the statutory window for termination and more cases
are litigated concerning the copyright termination provisions, a uniform
interpretation of the alienability of termination rights and the validity of
agreements that purport to relinquish those rights will be necessary to ensure
consistent application of the federal statute-particularly in two of the circuits to
which many courts look for guidance with respect to copyright law issues.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should revisit the issue it declined to address in
Steinbeck and resolve the current split of authority by overruling the Ninth
Circuit's narrow interpretation and restrictive application of the copyright
termination provisions. In doing so, the Court should favor the Second Circuit's
broad interpretation and liberal application of § 304(c)(5), which invalidates any
agreements that prohibit the exercise of termination rights, because the Second
Circuit's approach is more faithful to the statutory language and the legislative
history of the Copyright Act, leads to more fair and consistent outcomes, and
provides a more administrable legal standard.
IV. CONCLUSION

A true tension exists between the decisions from the Second and Ninth
Circuits with regard to whether or not termination rights can be relinquished or
otherwise alienated through contractual arrangements prior to their formal
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exercise. Cases from the Second Circuit, like the appellate opinions in Bourne and
Marvel Charactersand the district court opinion in Steinbeck, illustrate the Second
Circuit's broad interpretation of § 304(c)(5) and liberal application of that
provision to prevent the effect of contractual arrangements that purport to
interfere with termination rights. This broad reading is based on the court's literal
interpretation of the statutory language and its understanding that the underlying
legislative intent was to create an inalienable termination right to benefit authors
and protect the author's heirs, even against their own voluntary agreements.
The Ninth Circuit's Milne decision stands in opposition to the Second Circuit's
interpretation of termination rights as inalienable, as it upheld a contractual
agreement by one heir that expressly relinquished the termination rights of that
heir and effectively disinherited another heir of hers. The Ninth Circuit
supported this decision by narrowly interpreting the statutory language of the
termination provisions, so as to limit those provisions' interference with state
contract law. The Ninth Circuit's holding, however, is based on inappropriate
statutory construction and misplaced reliance on inapplicable legislative history.
The decisions from the Second Circuit reflect a more accurate interpretation
and application of both the termination provisions' statutory language and the
asserted legislative policy that they were enacted to promote. Further, the Second
Circuit's broad interpretation and liberal application of§ 304(c)(5) results in more
fair and consistent outcomes, as well as a more administrable legal standard, than
the Ninth Circuit's narrow interpretation and restrictive application of the statute.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation and application of the termination provisions
should not continue as good law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should, upon
its next opportunity, resolve the current split of authority in"favor of the broad
interpretation and liberal application of the termination provisions employed by
the courts of the Second Circuit.
Allison M. Scott
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